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Report Outline 
This report offers an overview of the impact of policy sensitive parameters on the profitability 
of residential energy refurbishments in the narrow sense. In the wider sense, parameters 
which affect the profitability assessment of measures or their variants are discussed. Moreo-
ver, the report identifies how rules and regulations can be calibrated to increase the odds of 
investments in energy efficiency within the European rental housing market.  
Using the RentalCal tool, market experiences from eight different European countries are 
compared and combined. This allows for comparative learning regarding the underlying poli-
cies of taxes, subsidies and rent regulations.  
This report starts with a short introduction into the RentalCal framework and a motivation of 
the analysis. In the second section, an overview of the RentalCal framework parameters is 
listed, in which each parameter is discussed and explained with respect to its relative im-
portance and regarding the influence of policymakers on each. In section three, the out-
comes of international comparisons are discussed across the eight markets that are part of 
the RentalCal project and translate the implications of these comparisons into key policy rec-
ommendations. We conclude this report with the main insights of this comparative analysis, 
and offer an overview of related reports as further readings.     
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1 Introduction 
Residential energy efficiency analyses are far from straightforward. A wide plethora of con-
siderations needs to be explored, when analyzing the costs and benefits of these invest-
ments. There are benefits that can be defined in a traditional way as monetary returns (mi-
croeconomic benefits) and others as environmental, climate and macroeconomic benefits. 
However, this doesn’t collect and describe all benefits. Thus, the project tried to capture addi-
tional benefits for tenants (such as improved thermal comfort in summer and winter, poten-
tially improved indoor air quality), as well as for landlords (such as extension of the building 
envelope’s service life, improvement of lettability and marketability, positive impact on value 
stability and development) beyond the customary approaches and take them into account. In 
all cases, various institutional settings and dwelling-specific details need to be considered 
simultaneously, which isn’t an easy task.  
The RentalCal tool offers a framework for European landlords, that includes national and 
regional settings to absorb various local tax and legal requirements and adjusts these to the 
status of the tool user identity. This way, the RentalCal tool simplifies the complex process of 
information gathering and cost- benefit balancing, while ensuring all relevant inputs are in-
cluded and weighted objectively. On the output side, advancements and improvements are 
implemented as well. Relevant results are presented according to the perspectives of land-
lords, tenants and environment respectively. Key performance indicators (KPIs) are custom-
ised regarding the relevant actor group’s (investors, housing companies, private landlords) 
knowledge, customs and requirements and can be associated with them. Moreover, further 
target groups like politicians and energy consultants are reached and supported.  
This policy implication report builds on the merits of this RentalCal tool. Here, the tool will be 
used to assess the sensitivity of residential energy efficiency investments to the European 
variation in institutional settings, with a focus on the impact of policy sensitive parameters. In 
other words, this analysis compares the standard and most common values of the key Rent-
alCal input variables across eight European markets and uses the tool settings to translate 
this international variation into implications for the financial return on energetic refurbishment 
investments. This way, this analysis presents an assessment of which factors might contrib-
ute to the profitability of an energy efficiency investment. Moreover, this report also offers 
studies and references to national reports on energy efficiency policy across Europe that can 
inspire new thoughts on future regulations. 
This analysis on the international variation of regulations is executed without aiming for re-
furbishment outcomes. The academic literature has already shown that over-subsidization of 
energy efficiency may well lead up to net welfare losses (the expense of subsidies exceeding 
the benefits of energy savings)1. On the other hand, the benefits of measures directed at 
savings of energy resources and environmental protection are frequently underestimated. By 
taking external effects into account, enhanced investments and grants might turn out to be 
profitable. In this respect, the discussion is contradictory. In this situation in particular, there 
is a demand for transparent bases and tools for decision-making support. Funding pro-
grammes also might be interpreted as a means of sharing external benefits among the socie-
ty and individual owners in this context. Hence, results ought to be interpreted as mere sensi-
tivity analysis, where the odds of positive refurbishment outcomes are being related to the 
highest (max) and lowest (min) values of input variables across the eight markets. Here, 
                                                          
1 See for instance McKibbin et al. (2011) and Alcott (2015) for a full discussion on the effects and effectivity of 
energy efficiency subsidization in residential markets. 
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special emphasis is given to the input variables that can be directly influenced by govern-
ments, to help policymakers to optimize their policy decisions.  
This report consists of four sections. The report starts by listing the international variation of 
input default values. Next, the effects of the reported spread in values are analyzed and the 
sensitivity of the RentalCal tool outcomes to this variation is assessed. Finally, the most im-
portant lessons are listed and insights regarding local energy policies not explicitly included 
within the RentalCal tool are given. There is also a conclusion of the most important insights 
from this sensitivity analysis, which can help policymakers to (re)consider their own local 
regulations, taxes and incentives for stimulating energy efficiency refurbishments.  
The report ends with an appendix of a series of local studies on energy efficiency policies 
gathered from the partners’ professional experiences (Appendix A). Furthermore a list of pol-
icy insensitive tool variables is presented (Appendix B) as well as the national situation of 
energy conservation policies and incentive systems in the participating countries (Appendix 
C).  
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2 RentalCal tool policy sensitive input variables 
The RentalCal tool absorbs numerous factors and considerations, all needed to make a fair ex-ante analysis of the cost-benefits tradeoff of 
residential energy efficiency refurbishments. The tool is designed to combine inputs regarding the property owner, the dwellings, the refur-
bishments and the required financing, but also regarding the local housing market and the outlook of rents and (energy) prices. This collec-
tion of inputs varies greatly across dwellings, but also across markets, as some input are policy related and can therefore take different val-
ues in each market. In this report, these input data have been examined in great detail. The first effort was to qualify which inputs are policy 
sensitive.  
In the table below, a list of policy-related input data is listed. After this identification, each variable has been studied regarding its influence on 
one of the most central performance indicators in the RentalCal tool – the return on equity (ROE) – listed in the second column. The input 
data are listed in the order of importance, which is determined by the strength of the influence each has on the ROE outcome (column three). 
In other words, the most important input data are listed on top. In the fourth column, a short comment is given of how each input item is in-
cluded into the model. Finally, in the fifth and final column, the relevance for policymakers is discussed. This is a short answer to the question 
– what can policymakers do to enhance energy efficiency retrofits based on this specific data item?    
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Table 1: Overview of policy sensitive input variables 
Selected tool input variable (policy sensitive) Influence on RoE (tool based) 
Strenght of 
influence on 
RoE 
Comment Relevance for policy  makers 
Interest rate of subsidized loans lower interest rate leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) strong 
depending on difference of subsi-
dized interest rate to individual 
borrowing rate  
Offering of sound financial 
incentives in funding pro-
grams 
Repayment bonus  higher repayment bonus leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) strong 
combination of a grant with a subsi-
dized loan 
Offering of sound financial 
incentives in funding pro-
grams 
Resulting rent increase after retrofit  higher rent increase lead to higher RoE (and vice versa) strong 
depending on rent increase mecha-
nism and/or green premiums Change in rent setting rules 
Expected amount of eligible grants higher grant leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) strong 
grants are treated as additional 
rental income 
Offering of sound financial 
incentives in funding pro-
grams 
Expected volume of subsidized loans 
higher amount of subsidized 
loan leads to higher RoE (and 
vice versa) 
moderate 
depending on difference of subsi-
dized interest rate to individual 
borrowing rate  
Offering of sound financial 
incentives in funding pro-
grams 
Marginal taxation  rate (on rental income) lower tax rate leads to higher RoE (and vice versa)  moderate 
depending on additional rental in-
come Change in  taxation  rules  
 Value-Added Tax (VAT) deductibility VAT deduction leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate no sensitivity (only yes or no) Change in taxation rules 
Expected growth rate for net rent  higher growth rate leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate 
depending on the possibility of fu-
ture rent adjustments (independent 
from rent increase after refurbish-
ment) 
Change in rent setting rules 
Energy cost savings (energy costs before minus 
energy costs after refurbishment) 
higher savings (rent increase) 
lead to higher RoE (and vice 
versa) 
moderate 
only if landlords contribute to heat-
ing costs (e.g. gross rent) or if rent 
increase is linked to energy cost 
savings 
Change in distribution of 
running costs and/or rent 
setting rules 
Change in annual maintenance, inspection and 
repair costs (non-reimbursable) 
lower non-reimbursable annu-
al cost leads to higher RoE 
(and vice versa) 
moderate depending on distribution of running cost between landlord and tenant 
Change in distribution of 
running costs  
Depreciation rate  higher depreciation rate leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate 
depending on individual tax rate and  
amount of rental income 
Change in depreciation 
rules 
National VAT rate  lower VAT rate leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) weak depending on country selection 
Reduction of VAT rate for 
energy efficiency invest-
ments 
Period (term) of the subsidized loans 
longer term of subsidized loan 
leads to higher RoE (and vice 
versa) 
weak due to longer fixed reduction of interest rate 
Offering of sound financial 
incentives in funding pro-
grams 
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Among others, it becomes clear that there is a target conflict between the improvement of profitability of energy saving measures for inves-
tors on the one hand and the issue of affordability of living space for tenants on the other hand. Further research is required here.  
The four strongest input variables are the interest rate of subsidized loans, the repayment bonus, the potential rent increase due to the refur-
bishment, and the expected amount of eligible grants. Four financial variables that can be incentivized by policymakers to strengthen the 
case of energy efficiency retrofits by; lowering the interest rates on subsidized loans, by allowing for high rent increases after energetic refur-
bishments, and by increasing repayment bonuses and grant amounts. Within the RentalCal tool, these three adjustments turn out to have a 
strongly positive effect on the consequential ROE.  
In yellow, a list of seven more variables is highlighted. These are input variables that policymakers can tweak to stimulate energy retrofits. 
But in this case, the impact of these variables is less pervasive than the four on top. Obviously, enabling landlords to access larger subsi-
dized loan amounts will help to drive up the project ROE, but less so than a grant, as loans need to be repaid while grants are awarded.  
 
In this ‘moderate’ category, tax related items are to be found as well. This matters, but at the same a smaller cross-sectional variation was 
observed. In other words, in practice differences have not been set large enough to materialize into large marginal effects. It is worth to 
stress the (sometimes hidden) costs following changes in maintenance, inspection and repair. Heating system related energy efficiency 
measures often cause higher running costs and need additional energy- elements to be considered when assessing the profitability of an 
energy efficiency investment. 
In the bottom of table 1, the national VAT rate and the term of the subsidized loans are mentioned. Both can increase the ROE of refurbish-
ments, but due to the small variations observed in the available data, this impact is expected to be modest at best. 
In table 2 below, an overview of the observed variation in some policy sensitive tool variables in three countries is given as an illustration. As 
one can see the variation is vast, even across the four top variables that matter most. The interest rate on subsidized loans is lowest in Ger-
many. Dutch policymakers could enhance the refurbishment profitability by matching their current high rates to the ones in Germany. The 
German policymakers also stimulate refurbishment by means of a repayment bonus, which is absent in the other sampled markets. The in-
creases in rent after refurbishments are not just an outcome of local policies as market demand and the supply will determine the new equi-
librium rent. On the other hand, if legislators don’t limit rent increases by regulations, these increases can be maximized to absorb refurbish-
ment costs fully. This is the case in Netherlands, where the non-regulated rent market does not inflict any limits on rent levels or rent in-
creases. Finally, regarding the eligible grants, the variation is significant as well. While the Danish government does not grant any funds for 
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energetic refurbishment investments, Germany offers several subsidies that can even be combined within one 
project. More details will be given in the next section of this report.    
Table 2: Typical variable values across three of the sampled markets 
Selected tool input variable (policy sensitive) Denmark Germany Netherlands 
Interest rate of subsidized loans 2.0% 0.75% 2.8% 
Repayment bonus  no 7.5%-27.5% No 
Resulting rent increase after retrofit n/a 0-50% 0-25% 
Expected amount of eligible grants 0 10.000 € 2.500 € 
Expected volume of subsidized loans 0 Up to €100.000 Up to  €15.000 
Marginal tax rate 50 35%-47.5% 51% 
Expected growth rate for net rent n/a 3.0% 2.0% 
Depreciation rate  0 2-100% 3% 
National VAT rate  25% 19% 21% 
Term of the subsidized loans n/a 10 years 30 years 
 
Regarding the category of moderate impact variables, the observed dispersion is milder. Marginal tax rates are more alike across markets, 
and expected net rent growth rates hover around 2-3%. The main difference is found in the available subsidized loan volumes, which are 
large in Germany and absent in Denmark. This is even more so the case or the variables with lowest impact. The national VAT rates vary 
between 19-25%, and loans terms between 10 and 30 years. But in the larger scheme of things, these differences matter less, as loans 
terms will have only marginal impact on the return on investments.   
The profitability of refurbishment investments in residential energy efficiency are not the sole outcome of policies and grants. The RentalCal 
tool has demonstrated that a wide plethora of variables needs to be considered when doing the math. In table 2, a list of policy-sensitive var-
iables was given and discussed. But it is also important to realize that additional policy measures that are not part of the tool can also impact 
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the path towards energy efficiency. One example is the setting of strict energy standard for new development 
and refurbishments. In some markets, like Denmark, authorities impose very strict standards and thereby effectively stimulate the invest-
ments in energy efficiency gains. In other markets, like the Netherlands, such standards are absent when refurbishments are considered. A 
combination of the two approaches is offered by the device of “Individual refurbishment road maps”2: i.e. long term energy efficiency targets 
are individually established and a set of measures for reaching the goals are presented to the investor. The energy efficiency road maps 
serve the demand of predictability and stability of investors. 
Another factor that matters, which is less a function of direct government policy design, is the ratio between construction and energy costs. In 
case the ratio is low, energetic refurbishments are more likely to occur. In some markets, policymakers can use taxes and subsidies to tilt this 
ratio – either by reducing construction costs by for instance lowering VAT, or by increasing energy costs by imposing additional taxes - to-
wards the benefit of energy efficiency. 
     
                                                          
2 R. Henger  et al Energiewende im Gebäudebestand, Handlungsempfehlungen für mehr Investitionen in den Klimaschutz IW Analysen 19, 2017. 
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3 Additional requirements for a proper calculation data base 
As set out above a lot of variables has been considered and integrated in the tool. While de-
signing the tool observation of deficits were made. For a future improvement of any calcula-
tion and the decision base, the following observation should be considered.  
a) Improvement of the calculation base for expected energy savings: Calculation ap-
proaches developed for the formulation and review of energy performance require-
ments are often used to forecast expected energy savings. They contain various as-
sumptions and specifications. Due to the large difference between forecast and actual 
savings (see e.g. Results from CONCERTO PREMIUM3), investors lose confidence 
in such information. This is a decisive obstacle. Therefor calculation approaches are 
needed that offer realistic estimation of savings, taking into account the specific cli-
mate, the current occupancy and the specific user behaviour. 
 
b) Improvement of the data base regarding the service life of technical building ele-
ments: In addition to the investment costs, the profitability analysis also takes into ac-
count the financial expenditure for replacement investments in building services 
equipment (TGA or HVAC). There is an urgent need for data on the service life of 
building services systems and their components. In the EU, technical service life data 
will be included in the EPD (environmental product declaration) in the future4. The 
described requirements can also be applied accordingly to components improving the 
thermal insulation - e.g. insulation layers, thermal insulation systems, windows. 
 
c) Improvement of the data base for running costs of technical building elements: Run-
ning costs of technical building systems are part of the profitability calculation. Among 
others, these are costs for inspection and maintenance (incl. cleaning), costs for re-
pair, costs for auxiliary energy and operating materials, costs for insurance (e.g. for 
photovoltaic systems).  For profitability calculations there is an urgent need for data to 
include influences on running costs5.  
 
d) Improvement of the awareness of synergy effects: Thermal roof insulation will have a 
positive effect on the thermal comfort in summer. Cooling can be avoided or the cool-
ing load/ cooling energy can be reduced. Such synergy effects should be taken into 
account, especially in southern countries. They also may improve the profitability. 
 
e) Improvement of the empirical evidence on the additional benefits for landlords and 
tenants: The RentalCal consortium has made intensive efforts to investigate the ef-
fects of energy saving measures with regard to non-monetary effects for the time be-
ing. In order to convince investors and tenants of such additional benefits, further 
empirical evidence is required for:  
(1) Do landlords benefit from the extension of the service life of external walls as this 
contributes to the image and any sustainability report? 
(2) Do tenants appreciate a higher thermal comfort of indoor air quality in the heating 
and cooling period? 
                                                          
3 http://www.buildup.eu/en/news/concerto-premium-technical-monitoring-database-eu-wide-database-
makes-results-concerto-projects 
4 In Germany, this is the subject of the further development of the VDI 2067 standard in cooperation with KIT  
5 The VDI 2067 standard provides assistance in identifying relevant cost groups.   
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f) Consideration and extension of actor-specific performance indicators: The perfor-
mance indicators and key figures typically used by different actors groups (housing 
companies, non-professional private landlords, energy -consultants) need more spe-
cific consideration. Less significant and demotivating data (e.g. static amortisation 
time) should be replaced by more complex performance indicators (e.g. economic 
advantage including value enhancement).  
 
g) Complementing economic and ecological considerations: Many practitioners are 
sceptical about the ratio between the amount of energy required to implement energy 
saving measures and the energy savings actually achieved. The energy expenditure 
for the production of insulating materials and photovoltaic systems is overestimated6.   
 
h) Improvement of the environmental relief quantification data base: Conserving re-
sources (here energy carriers) by means of energy saving measures and climate pro-
tection by reducing greenhouse gas emissions meanwhile are treated jointly. In con-
trast to primary energy factors, which are generally public and freely accessible, there 
are gaps in the provision of emission factors. 
 
4 Policy implications gathered from the national levels  
The starting point for policy implications has been the partners’ each national perspective. 
The whole project endeavored to collect and compare national approaches for improving 
energy efficiency investment. The web tool mirrors eight European countries energy efficien-
cy profitability calculations. The cross country perspective is based on those findings and is 
taken to compare and to establish a common denominator of European policy implications. 
Following those most relevant national policy implications are listed and assessed on its rela-
tive impact for national and European policies addressing energy efficiency and profitability 
of investments.     
For illustrating the national situation see the Appendix C. 
 
4.1 High impact of subsidized loans and grants for improving the energy performance  
Taken the assumption that investment costs don’t pay back in a proper period of time (or 
they proof not to be profitable if alternative KPIs are applied) subsidies and grants are an 
important instrument for increasing the affordability of energy efficiency investment policies in 
the rental housing sector. All countries offer grants and subsidies in various numbers and 
with different conditions such as payback pauses or combination of grant and loans with 
rates. Especially for those investors with low incomes and in times of low interest rates,  
loans are less attractive than direct grants as set out below.  
The viability of alternative subsidy approaches should also be taken into account. For exam-
ple, it should be examined whether and how the abatement of greenhouse gases could be 
                                                          
6 Using a calculation tool developed at KIT and made available via the project page, it can be shown that the 
energetic payback period for subsequent thermal insulations is only in the range of months (in Germany).  
Looking at the greenhouse gas emission similar dimensions can be shown.   
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remunerated by some reward per ton to create a financial incentive. The amount of the re-
muneration could follow the external cost per ton of greenhouse gases as suggested by the 
German Umweltbundesamt (UBA 2012). This approach is utility-oriented and distributes the 
benefits among society and investor, independently from the investor’s income situation. 
 
4.2 High impact of tax deductions and depreciation 
Taxation categories and rules vary widely within the countries. The impact on tax deductions 
depends on the effects of reducing the energy efficiency costs. The common basis for taxa-
tion is the personal rental income (with other earned income sources, incl. capital gains) with 
a general personal income tax scale (PIT) progressive with 2-5 levels, with some exceptions 
in The Netherlands, France and Great Britain. All countries show a flat corporate income tax 
on companies’ profits. Property and transaction taxation can be found in all countries with 
variation of the taxation basis (property value, local add on). The exception is Denmark with 
no PIT and Spain.  
Tax deductions are quite common for maintenance expenses. Individual depreciation rules 
for building components are uncommon in the national taxation schemes in practice. Precise 
definitions concerning distinction between those expenditures lack.  
For small income investors it is of particular importance to receive tax deductions based on 
the tax liability (i.e. the tax amount to be paid) instead of receiving a deduction based on the 
income.  
Municipalities may charge the increase of the urban land value increases while the land is 
sold. The investment improving the property is recognised as increasing balance-sheet value 
of the property. Intending a higher rate of energy efficiency “punishing” such investment is 
counterproductive. Instead for the benefit of the environment and the investor that kind of 
investment should be honoured by reduced local charges.     
Depreciation rules and their relation to balance-sheet value of real estate are relatively uni-
fied and have a high impact on the profitability. However, there is still poor harmonisation of 
tax related rules. In addition, depreciation rules need higher flexibility and cut of deduction 
periods: The different components of a set of energy efficiency measures (life cycle ap-
proach) need specific depreciation rules. 
 
4.3 Medium to high impact of combined regulation and funding 
While investments into new buildings can be enhanced by regulative measures supplement-
ed by financial promotion, this effect turns out to be less powerful when related to the existing 
building stock. Paired with economic steering mechanisms, as described above, regulations 
are quality drivers accepted by the market7.  
Looking through the investor’s eyes the implementation of energy efficiency standards must 
be economically sound and not just a climate goal driven challenge.  
However, for the sake of CO2 reduction political decision makers have to consider if invest-
ments must not get public funding beyond the profitability established with the RentalCal tool: 
                                                          
7IWU: Immobilien-und Wohnungswirtschaftliche Strategien zum Klimawandel, 2012. 
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Are public authorities prepared to invest into energy efficiency in those cases where there is 
no proper return of RoE? Must public authorities (European, national and sub-national) be 
prepared to fund non profitable investments in order to contribute to the climate goals while 
private investors can only be asked for investments which are economically sound? From the 
authorities’ point of view, the RentalCal tool might be helpful in dimensioning subsidy pro-
grammes to help such investments beyond their profitability threshold. Combining the regula-
tory framework with funding and a transparent information scheme appears to be the most 
promising approach for a climate protection strategy which has to meet the challenge of in-
creasing the refurbishment rates against the background of a large variety of individual situa-
tions of existing buildings. In principle, positive (e.g. subsidies and grants) and negative (e.g. 
a fee on energy consumption on top of the energy prices or CO2 taxes) financial incentives 
can be applied. Some of those mechanisms are already implemented but not strong enough.  
 
4.4 Medium impact of “soft” measures  
In addition to the “hard” measures of regulatory law paired with economic incentives, which 
will probably be necessary for attaining the targets, also “soft” measures of information, quali-
fication and market transparency have to be considered (e.g. better education of craftsmen, 
improved planning and quality control8, education and employment of energy consultants). 
Besides financially driven incentive structures there are consumer driven incentive struc-
tures: Still rather limited research observes that information on consumption (easy to read 
and easy to understand) contributes to energy awareness that smart feedback devices sup-
port young and internet affine consumers and that high costs for energy (heat and hot water 
looked into) contribute to a careful consumption (unless consumers are rich enough not to 
care for costs). Following these principles different activities can be observed: Public funded 
road maps for energetic modernization of individual buildings, obligation to deliver an energy 
performance certificate, awareness raising campaigns, supplying rental flats with high effi-
cient household devices. The partners’ countries stress different approaches which are de-
scribed in Appendix C. 
 
4.5 Limited impact of rent increase mechanisms 
Although the legal framework of all countries offers the refinancing of modernization costs by 
means of rent increases this is not always a strong incentive for investment. The reasons 
behind are not just legal ones but factual reasons as the market situation might not allow the 
full rent increase. For example, in competitive markets, effective rent increases usually are 
below the legal possibilities. Other reasons such as social corporate responsibility demands 
for public/ municipal owned housing companies might limit potential rent increases to secure 
affordable rents for the tenants. However, this creates a significant split incentive barrier, is 
lowering green value margins and prolonging pay back periods for deep retrofits which often 
are not refundable by moderate rent increases. An additional hardship stems from the mod-
ernization packages: energy efficiency measures don’t stand alone but come together with 
other improvements that impact rent increases.  
 
 
                                                          
8IWU: Zielerreichungsszenario 2013. 
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4.6 Low impact of running costs for energy because of split incentive phenomena  
There is no financial need to invest into energy efficiency for an investor as long as the ten-
ant is charged with costs of heating, maintenance and inspection costs. In all countries ener-
gy costs (heating, hot water, electricity, and related maintenance and inspection costs (often 
called running costs or 2nd rent)) can become a contractual obligation of the tenants. As long 
as this is the case and the landlord is not obliged to invest into energy efficiency, for example 
by technical standards in case of modernization activities, there is no financial reason for 
energy efficiency investments. The impact of running costs for energy expenses is low as 
long as the investing landlord doesn’t have to pay them. 
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5 Conclusions and suggestions addressing the European level 
This policy analysis, based on the RentalCal’s framework conditions, reveals a latent hierar-
chy in the impact of various policy sensitive variables. Policy makers have a wide plethora of 
rules and regulations at their disposal, but not all measures and means are equally effective 
when considering the return on residential energetic efficiency investments. When looking at 
the return on required equity (ROE) the interest rate of subsidized loans, repayment bonus-
es, the amount of eligible grants, and rent increases that result from retrofits matters most. 
Governments can influence these input variables by offering lower interest rates or by loos-
ening rent regulations to allow for larger rent increases after energetic retrofits. The calcula-
tions and simulations in our RentalCal tool show that lowering VAT rates or stretching the 
terms of subsidized loans have only weak effects on retrofit ROE.  
When comparing across markets, we find that the German rules and regulations are set most 
favorable, especially regarding the variables that have the strongest ROE impact. In Germa-
ny investments in residential energetic retrofits meet the lowest interest rates for subsidized 
loans, enjoy the largest repayment bonuses, and can expect the largest grants.  
Obviously, the RentalCal tool cannot absorb all relevant details for each single case. For the 
future, we recommend to invest in more precise cost data for HVAC-technology (life-cycle 
costs, maintenance costs and repair costs) to allow for more precise model estimations, also 
regarding energy savings, in the future. Moreover, the RentalCal tool is currently designed to 
balance the financial costs and benefits of retrofits. But, obviously there is more than mone-
tary flows alone. Additional benefits regarding CO2 reductions, stranded asset risk reduction, 
and personal comfort can be incorporated more explicitly in future policy assessments. Fur-
thermore, we see new changes and opportunities that will affect the impact of energy policy 
measures. For instance, IFRS lease accounting, which will change perspectives of rent ver-
sus own decisions and may well increase the demand for shorter lease terms. Thus account-
ing changes (regulations) can have moderating effects on retrofits decisions and should be 
included in future analyses. Taxing CO2 emissions ( however at the energy producers’ side 
instead of taxing consumers) is another example of future policy considerations that ought to 
be explored within the financial analysis of energetic retrofits, as these taxes may well tilt the 
balance between costs and benefits towards more positive net present values.  
Taxation policy needs to address property values: investments into energy efficiency- alt-
hough increasing the (green) value of the construction should not be punitive but supportive 
by taxing the land and not the construction. However, for changing the regulatory regime of 
property taxation in many countries the local and regional level must be included.    
The following cross country findings are presented for political consideration: 
• Direct financial support of energy efficiency measures by grants and very low inter-
est loans 
• Introduction of a climate component in housing subsidies for low-income households 
to consider higher rents in energy efficient buildings. 
• Reductions based on the tax liability ( i.e. the tax amount to be paid) 
• Income tax reliefs by depreciation  
• Short term and flexible depreciation rules based on components (life cycle of 
measures) 
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• Transparent and consistent long lasting funding programmes  
• Clearing and streamlining of the “programme jungle”  
• Stress on information instruments (energy performance assessment (EPA), energy 
consultancy, rental table) 
• Further extension of “green” premiums within the legal system of rent control (or rent 
indices like in Germany)9. 
• Energy performance reflected in the building valuation (example German estate ap-
praisement ordinance ImmoWertV)10.   
• Broadening the knowledge base of energy saving potentials, life cycle costs of ener-
gy efficiency devices for minimizing risks and maximizing investment appetite 
• Information on and acceptance of non-fiscal benefits of energy efficiency invest-
ments (lettability, indoor health and comfort)   
• Stress on quality and monitoring of consultancy services (EU 2012/27/EU directive) 
• Harmonisation of rental and tax law   
• No punishment but financial benefits for green investments (tax exemption 
/reduction for green construction or green sales price)   
• Predictable rent increase mechanisms based on energy efficiency measures 
• Limitation of rent increase without measurable investments into energy efficiency  
• “Cost optimal level” of EPBD recast, the EU directive 2010/31 and the EU energy ef-
ficiency directive 2012/ 27 needs to integrate the investor’s perspective as long as 
there are split incentives 
 
 
 
   
 
  
                                                          
9 An integration of the energetic quality into the rental index9 provides housing companies and investors with 
the security of being able to consider the impact of improvements of the energetic quality on the rent on the 
basis of a publicly recognised basis. However, there are still no uniform rules as to how exactly this can be done 
beyond a guideline. 
10 Current research within the Horizon2020 RenoValue project (KIT with partners) explores how these “green” 
premiums ought to be included in modern property appraisals. In Germany, there is now a legal requirement 
that value appraisers must also take into account the energetic properties (energy performance) when prepar-
ing a valuation report. This ensures that this aspect is taken into account. However, the regulation does not 
contain any specific indications as to how this should be done.  
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Appendix A: Energy efficiency policy studies  
 
1. National building renovation strategies prepared in course of implementation of Ener-
gy Efficiency Strategy https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency-
directive/buildings-under-eed  
2. Impact of energy performance certificates on transaction prices in selected countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France Ireland, UK included) 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20130619-
energy_performance_certificates_in_buildings.pdf  
3. Impact of energy performance certificates on property value and nZEB in selected 
countries for policy makers (relevant for Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, UK) http://zebra2020.eu/website/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/D3.1-Final-AR_RD_2.pdf and for professionals and users 
http://zebra2020.eu/publications/the-impact-of-energy-performance-certificates-on-
property-values-and-nearly-zero-energy-buildings-2/  
4. Strategies for nZEB market transition on national level (relevant for Austria, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, UK) 
http://zebra2020.eu/publications/strategies-for-nzeb-market-transition-on-national-
level/  
5. Overview of building-related policies (relevant for Austria, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain)    http://zebra2020.eu/publications/overview-of-building-related-policies/  
6. Financing a sustainable European Economy 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180131-sustainable-finance-final-
report_en.pdf  
7. EU Building stock Observatory http://building-obs.enerdata.net/eubuildings  
8. Proposal for amendment to Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_en_act_part1_v10.pdf  
9. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/com_860_final.pdf  
10. Accelerating clean energy in buildings 
http://www.buildup.eu/sites/default/files/content/1_en_annexe_autre_acte_part1_v9.p
df 
11. Energiewende im Gebäudebestand, Handlungsempfehlungen für mehr Investitionen 
in den Klimaschutz Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Analysen 19, 2017. 
www.iwmedien.de 
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Appendix B: List of policy insensitive variables 
Selected tool input data (profitability drivers) Influence on RoE (tool based) 
Strenght of 
influence on 
RoE 
Comment Relevance for policy ma-kers 
Energy-related investment costs  (NET) lower investment cost lead to higher RoE (and vice versa) strong 
distinction of energy-related investment 
costs and anyway costs not common in 
all countries 
Generally not influenceable 
Exit yield for the buyer (terminal cap-rate) 
lower cap rate leads to higher exit 
value and to higher RoE (and vice 
versa) 
strong resulting effect depending on the market Generally not influenceable 
Expected further development of maintenance, 
repair and inspection costs 
for savings: higher rate leads to 
higher RoE (and vice versa)  
for additional costs: lower rate 
leads to higher RoE (and vice 
versa) 
moderate only in case of changes in non-reimbursable costs Generally not influenceable 
Savings rate projection (change per year) higher savings rate in future leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate 
depending on possible VOFI reinvest-
ment Generally not influenceable 
Borrowing rate projection (change per year) 
lower borrowing rate in future 
leads to higher RoE (and vice 
versa) 
moderate depending on variability of borrowing rate und borrowing rate projection Generally not influenceable 
Change in vacancy rate of the property after refur-
bishment 
reduction of vacancy rate lead to 
higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate 
energy efficiency refurbishment could 
reduce vacancy rate especially in poor 
markets 
Generally not influenceable 
Calculation period for profitability analysis longer calculation period leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate default value depending on investor type Generally not influenceable 
Individual savings rate (on bank account) higher savings rate leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate 
depending on difference to individual 
borrowing rate Generally not influenceable 
Debt portion  
higher debt portion leads to higher 
RoE (and vice versa) if RoE is 
higher than borrowing rate (lever-
age effect) 
moderate default value depending on investor type Generally not influenceable 
Individual borrowing rate (for market loan) lower borrowing rate leads to higher RoE (and vice versa) moderate depending on general interest level Generally not influenceable 
Repayment method (loan structure) different loan types lead to slightly different RoE weak 
depending on variability of borrowing 
rate und borrowing rate projection Generally not influenceable 
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Appendix C:  Evaluating and comparing energy conservation policies and incen-
tive systems in the participating countries 
 
This appendix deals with policies and incentives for heat conservation. This could for in-
stance be questions like: Is it possible to get low interest long term loans? Can the net rent 
be increased when the energy bill, due to house insulation is reduced? Are the heat tariffs 
furthering energy conservation? Are there energy codes for new buildings, and for renova-
tion? Are there subsidies for heat conservation activities? Is there an energy consultancy 
service system? Are there subsidies for energy conservation? And many other specified in-
centives and policies.   
The report is trying to answer the questions whether the RentalCal countries are on the right 
energy conservation policy and incentive track. Where this is not the case it is shortly dis-
cussed and elaborated which policies and incentive changes are needed in order to reach 
energy conservation goals. Each country section is based on information from the RentalCal 
participants in the respective country section, and therefore on very concrete knowledge from 
each country. 
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Germany  
The German energy conservation incentive system  
In Germany operation costs like energy costs usually are paid by the tenant. Landlords are 
obliged to meter (hot) water and energy costs and to charge costs by consumption. Besides 
elevated construction standards and regulations there are three main incentives for energy 
conservation in rental buildings: 
1. Increasing the rent after energetic modernization 
- Given the eminent role of the private rental sector, the reduction of split incentives in 
the rental housing industry is an important pillar of energy policy in Germany. The 
regulations dealing with the split of interests between landlords and tenants are those 
of the German Civil Code, the BGB. Basically, the legal system opens two different 
approaches: the cost approach and the rent-control-approach.  
- Choosing the cost approach, the landlord has the right to implement (amongst others) 
modernization measures which induce sustainable savings of energy (heat and elec-
tricity) or water unilaterally. Legal regulations allow shifting modernization costs to 
tenants up to an annual maximum of 11 % of the investment costs (net subsidies and 
maintenance costs). Under the present CDU/SPD Berlin coalition a Civil Code draft 
regulation is discussed that reduces the 11% threshold down to 8% percent together 
with an absolute upper ceiling of 3.00 €/m² rent increase. This shall help to concen-
trate modernization to meaningful energy efficiency measures. 
- Choosing the rent control approach in case of modernizations the landlord is allowed 
to increase the contractual rent up to the level that average market participants would 
pay for the improved comfort or energy cost reductions. In other words, energy effi-
ciency may shift the rent ceiling upwards, thus incorporating “green” premiums in the 
legal system of rent control in Germany. 
2. Subsidies for energetic modernization 
A further pillar of energy efficient investment policies in the rental housing sector are subsi-
dies: At present the main public funding schemes stem from the federal government owned 
bank the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). To a lesser extent, grants are available from 
different federal, state and municipal bodies.   
3. Taxation 
At present taxation does not play an eminent role in order to facilitate energy saving invest-
ments. However tax reductions are quite highly appreciated finally (after various motions to 
establish tax reduction for EE investment) the present CDU/SPD Berlin coalition agreed upon 
tax deductions within the coalition contract, i.e. tax reductions rules might be considered. The 
2019 budget draft does not reflect this approach yet.  
Requirements to capitalize modernization investments exist for all investments that lead to 
any substantial increase of the building standard. Linear depreciation allowance rates range 
from 2 % to 2.5 % annually. Any other costs are eligible for immediate write off or write off 
over a 5 years period. Thus, recovery periods are not bound to the working life of building 
components within the tax system. 
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Evaluation of the German energy conservation incentive system  
A trend analysis by IWU of the development of thermal protection and heat supply shows 
that the existing incentive instruments in Germany are not sufficient for attaining the goals of 
the energy concept till 2020 and 2050 neither in total building stock nor in rental building 
stock (IWU: Zielerreichungsszenario 2013). 
The possibilities to increase rents after energetic modernization are sufficient but in competi-
tive markets, effective rent increases usually are below the 11%-figure. Furthermore some 
landlords limit the rent increase to secure affordable rents for the tenants.  
Subsidies for energetic modernization (mainly those offered by KfW) are often used also by 
landlords but are not sufficient to double the thermal modernization rate. Furthermore land-
lords prefer grants more than low interest loans especially regarding to the actual low interest 
period. 
Suggestions for an improved incentive structure 
In the new building sector the step-by-step transition to a climate neutral standard in 2020 
can be realized by regulative measures (especially the energy saving ordinance) and a sup-
plementary financial promotion. 
Concerning the existing building stock there is also the option of regulative legal measures. 
Here economic steering mechanisms appear to be the most promising approach for a cli-
mate protection strategy which has to meet the challenge of increasing the refurbishment 
rates against the background of a large variety of individual situations of existing buildings. In 
principle, positive (e.g. subsidies and grants) and negative (e.g. a fee on energy consumption 
on top of the energy prices) financial incentives can be applied. Some of those mechanisms 
are already implemented but their impact is not strong enough.  
In addition to the “hard” measures of regulatory law and economic incentives, which will 
probably be necessary for attaining the targets, also “soft” measures of information, qualifica-
tion and market transparency have to be considered (e.g. better education of craftsmen, im-
proved planning and quality control). (IWU: Zielerreichungsszenario 2013) 
Bet case incentives/ideas 
Among others the following elements of a good “incentive structure” are discussed in Ger-
many: 
- Introduction of full repayment bonus or grants in addition to low interest loans of KfW 
also for professional landlords of multi-family buildings. 
- Introduction of direct refund of taxes up to 10 % of investment costs for energetic 
modernization. 
- Further extension of “green” premiums in the legal system of rent control in Germany. 
IWU has executed several research projects for the federal ministry of housing, that 
deal with the question how to empirically measure market premiums for energy effi-
ciency in legal rent surveys. 
- Introduction of public funded road maps for the energetic modernization of individual 
buildings. These voluntary road maps should be established by energy consultants.  
- Introduction of a climate component in housing subsidies for low-income households 
to consider higher rents in energy efficient buildings. 
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- “Mieterstrom”- tenants electricity: the local production and consumption of high re-
newable energy (instead of feeding the electricity into the grids) receives a small bo-
nus of 0, 02 €-0, 04 € per kWh. Landlords can opt for this bonus in case they want to 
establish renewable electricity production. Landlords take a quite strong interest in 
the Mieterstrom concepts:  because this model can help to keep electricity costs sta-
ble (although  running costs can be passed on to tenants landlords with an interest in 
affordable rents take care of the “2nd rent”- see I b). Because Mieterstrom offers bet-
ter margins compared with selling the electricity to the overall grit as payment for 
feeding the grits decreases. Because renewables count for the primary energy factor.   
Besides financially driven incentive structures there are consumer driven incentive struc-
tures: Still rather limited research observes that information on consumption (easy to read 
and easy to understand) contributes to energy awareness that smart feedback devices sup-
port young and internet affine consumers and that high costs for energy (heat and hot water 
looked into) contribute to a careful consumption (unless consumers are rich enough not to 
care for costs). Following these principles different official activities are under way:  
- Consumer protection organization offer low key approaches for special target groups 
(social aid, refugees, etc.) to raise awareness and to support reduced consumption 
- Energy efficiency information campaign of the DENA (German Energy Agency) 2002-
2004 
- Obligation to deliver an energy performance certificate (since 2009) reporting the en-
ergetic status of a flat / house (however not properly respected) 
- Landlords supplying rental flats with high efficient household devices (Thesenpapier 
Nutzerverhalten im Mietwohnungsbereich, Ulrike Hacke 2009; eSESH- Saving energy 
in social housing with ICT 2013 www.esesh.eu) 
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Poland  
The Polish energy conservation incentive system  
The building codes existing in Poland are applied in the case of construction of new buildings 
and partly in the case of modernization of the building. The owner of the residential building, 
who is doing insulation of walls, replacement of windows and doors must follow the request-
ed U-values of those components only and not the targeted EP of all the building. 
There are three voluntary incentive schemes for energy conservation available for owners of 
residential buildings, independent on the ownership form of them: 
I. The commercial loan subsidized by: 
1. 16% from the State Fund for Thermo-modernization and Renovation of Buildings 
when the savings in final energy calculated in the standardized energy audit exceed 
25% 
2. 15% from the State Fund for Thermo-modernization and Renovation of Buildings, 
available for buildings constructed before 1st August 1961 when the savings in final 
energy calculated in the standardized energy audit exceed 10% 
II. The white certificate scheme 
Owners of buildings or apartments may apply for tradeable certificate of 1 Mgoe savings when 
the energy savings measures result override 10 Mgoe per application. The value of one certif-
icate is nominally approximately 350€, but the market regulates the price (rather lower). 
III. The rent increase 
According to the Polish Law on Tenant`s Rights from 2001 art.8a, chapter 4b the landlord 
can increase the rent by 10% of investment cost which causes growth of usable value as 
result of long-lasting improvement of the premises. 
The first scheme mentioned above is responding quite well to the needs of owners of typical 
multi-family buildings, where the share of rented dwellings is relatively low. Within this struc-
ture, so far since 1998 approximately 35 000 residential buildings (34 000 multi-family and 
1000 single-family) were subject of deep renovation with minimum 25% reduction of final 
energy demand, but in average around 40%. 
The following graph and table present efficiency of this scheme: 
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The second scheme is used rather by home owners associations managed by professional 
facility managers and housing co-operatives, as the minimum 10Mgoe of savings is not 
achievable in the case of one buildings being subject of deep renovation. 
The third scheme is not used in the practice, as the tenants don`t agree with so high increase 
of rents and resign on renting the property or go to the court, which decides rather in favor of 
tenants. 
Evaluation of the Polish energy conservation incentive system  
The private multifamily buildings which are typical rental buildings in Poland, are located 
mostly in city areas being subject of historical monument preservation, so in these houses 
the reduction of energy consumption after deep modernization doesn`t reach the minimum 
required level of 25%, when applying for the subsidy accompanied by the commercial loan. 
Owners of single-family buildings are not using this scheme very frequently as their terms are 
not very favorable. The subsidy is subject of the personal income tax and its nominal level in 
comparison with the investment cost, cost of energy audit, tax and bank charges is not very 
high. 
There no incentive scheme for owners of rented dwellings. 
The reduced VAT tax (from 23% to 8%) is eligible for all types of residential properties in 
case of their renovation. 
Suggestions for an improved incentive structure 
NAPE suggested 2017 to the government improvement within the 1st scheme, which will 
consider higher cost and lower energy conservation results when the owners of buildings 
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being subject of historical monument preservation undertake deep renovation of their build-
ings. It could slightly increase their interest in performing more than usual renovation. 
Best case incentives/ideas 
- The 1st scheme, out of subsidy, provides assistance of advisors – energy auditors, 
who are helping investors – owners of buildings in selection of individual energy con-
servation measures and in sizing theme in technical and economic terms. Then, the 
energy auditors prepare the standardized energy audit, which is bankable document 
mandatory required while application procedure for subsidized loan. The loans are of-
fered to 100% investment cost and up to 20 years. 
- For owners of dwellings there was in Poland long time in force the scheme of reduc-
tion of personal income tax to some extend by the cost of renovation of dwellings. 
This scheme was very frequently used for replacement of windows and individual 
heat sources in dwellings. As this was the support instrument to rather pure renova-
tion measures, the energy conservation impact was not registered, but it appeared 
obviously. 
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Czech Republic  
The Czech energy conservation incentive system 
The incentive structures for energy conservation in rental buildings in the Czech Republic are 
the same as for other types of housing.  There are currently several supporting programs 
available for energy efficiency measures in the existing housing stock: 
- New Green Scheme (Nová Zelená úsporám) for family houses and multifamily hous-
es. Direct subsidies for thermal improvement of building envelope, efficient HVAC 
technologies and use of RES like heat pumps and PV cells, the subsidy amount de-
pending on the type of measure. In some regions the access to subsidy is limited  
due to overlapping with other subsidy programmes (Operation programme environ-
ment) 
- IROP funding scheme. European incentive for development of regions outside the 
capital city. 
- Panel 2013+ long term low interest loans for multifamily houses. Incentives for im-
provements of building envelope and HVAC systems applying to both repairs and 
renovations  
- For all types of support specific energy efficiency requirements must be fulfilled 
(standards and legislation). 
- Tax relief only for mortgages. 
- For buildings connected to district heating (DH) network usually a new contract is ne-
gotiated between the owner and the DH provider after the building renovation. 
 
Evaluation of the Czech energy conservation incentive system  
The incentives are sufficient to exploit a big part of the cost-effective energy saving potential.   
However despite the actions already undertaken, large cost-efficient energy saving potential 
still remains unexploited.   
It has been observed in the past that some of the energy efficiency measures were not as 
efficient as originally expected. This is due to multiple reasons (inappropriate technical solu-
tions, poor workmanship, neglected maintenance, durability issues and fading long-term 
properties and performance of used products, user´s behavior, e.g. rebound effect).   
It can be generally estimated that a standard renovation of buildings originating from the pe-
riod before 1978 would lead to about 40-45% of energy saving, if properly done. The later 
buildings with lower cost effective energy saving potential usually save up to 30-35% of en-
ergy. 
The energy conservation incentive structures are functioning but the functioning could be 
better, the explanation, see above.   
Some investors are lacking motivation due to unclear perspectives about the evolution of 
energy prices on the market as well as the monetary and fiscal policy outlooks in the country. 
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Suggestions for an improved incentive structure 
The following improvements should be considered:  
- Monitoring the energy consumption of the buildings after the energy efficiency 
measures are taken and adoption of corrective measures if the target is not met 
- Moving from the current mindset to a longer-term stable investment environment 
- Increasing the support for use of RES and removing barriers to decentralized energy 
production. 
Further, based on the recommendations of the Report on the achievement of national energy 
efficiency targets, measures shall be adopted to improve the use of existing instruments for 
increasing energy efficiency in buildings and, at the same time, existing barriers to the fulfil-
ment of the energy savings predictions to the policy measures adopted according to the Na-
tional Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) need to be eliminated. The following measures 
and instruments are involved in particular: 
- making the disbursement of grant program funds more effective by reducing the ad-
ministrative burden on applicants and eliminating other barriers to disbursement, 
- improving public awareness of the benefits of energy-saving measures  
- enlarging opportunities for funding projects promoting energy savings from grant pro-
grams 
 Best case incentives/ideas  
Good past experiences are in the field of free energy consultancy program EFEKT. The pri-
ority of the program is the education and training of both non-professional and professional 
audience, assistance to statutory cities and regions in implementing the energy management 
and support for small investment projects with direct energy savings especially for cities and 
villages, but also for small business projects.  
Although the EFEKT program has only a small budget it plays a vital role in the field of non-
financial energy efficiency support. It is however difficult to quantify the financial and energy 
efficiency impacts of this supporting measure. 
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Spain  
Spanish energy conservation incentive system 
There are no specific incentive structures for energy conservation in rental buildings. The 
incentives are for all buildings depending on their general use (housing, industrial…, see 
https://www.idae.es/ayudas-y-financiacion ). Two specific projects are devoted to a building 
refurbishing including energy efficiency (PAREER program), for de-carbonization process 
and energy renovation in public buildings (FEDER-POCS 2014-2020). There are no specific 
incentives for rental housing or private landlords. 
- The Spanish Building Code establishes the minimum requirements in terms of con-
struction isolation, energy consumption for hot water, renovation and refurbishment 
related to isolation and heating systems. For hot water, the common system applied 
(compulsory) are the solar energy produced in specific installations in housing blocks, 
or the integrated heating-hot water system with low-consumption systems like  con-
densation boilers. For the heating system, other than the high efficient systems (heat 
pumps or condensation boilers) are forbidden to be newly installed. The renovation of 
the existing ones plays a key role to improve the energy efficiency. Any rule which in-
centive the renovation is required. 
- There are no subsidies for energy conservation / renovation systems for private build-
ings and housing other than the fiscal ones and only few fiscal incentives are applied 
across Spain. This is probably changing shortly with the new government who has 
advice a change in the energy efficiency policy. 
- In some Spanish Regions (not in all), a part of investment in energy efficiency im-
provement leads to tax benefits as investors are allowed to reduce 10% of the capital 
used (or all costs incurred on) from the direct tax payment.  
- A reduction of the property tax was announced by the Ministry of Economy in 2017 
depending on the energy rating in each house. The reduction is not yet in place but it 
is expected to come during the following years due to the apparent change in the 
Spanish regulation. 
- The grant system was abolished in 2015 due to budgetary shortages and is not 
reestablished yet. The grants should be covered by the regional government budgets 
(and not the national one) which are also strongly constrained.  
- At the end of 2017, a new program started with incentives for energy building renova-
tion however applicable only to public buildings, for projects with deep rehabilitation 
and for owners of association (that is, for those buildings under ‘horizontal ownership’ 
regime to be energy efficient renovated but only applied to the common space co-
owned (roofs, basic common services, façades.). It is not applicable for private land-
lords. 
There is a lack on incentive structures in the energy conservation policy in Spain in order to 
allow for larger renovation and energy efficiency transformation in the housing stock. There is 
no special regulation for rental units other than those when the building is being built for rent-
al purposes. 
There is no incentive structure as such for the rental market. However, the market incentive 
estimated in the database for Mediterranean areas (built under RentalCal project) mirrors a 
green premium around 3% on prices. This means that a market incentive for retrofitting and 
31 
 
RentalCal — H2020-EE-2014-2015/H2020-EE-2018-3-MarketUptake Date: 2018-07-28 
RentalCal Consortium 
c/o IWU Institut Wohnen und Umwelt GmbH 
Rheinstrasse 65 
64295 Darmstadt, Germany 
Page 31 
 
 
 
reduction on energy consumption exists in the market, from the landlord perspective and in 
spite of the climatic area which has lower heating requirements. Differences on incentive 
between the colder areas and the hotter areas could reach 30%. The own findings show a 
market prices energy efficiency by a 3% in Mediterranean areas (although there is still limited 
evidence). 
As the rental market is still small (but equivalent to that in other countries in some main re-
gions and capitals) and very disperse in terms of landlordship in Spain, the incentives for the 
user to reduce the consumption should be general at this stage rather than only for rental 
sector. Having said this and considering the rental sector’s fast growing an opportunity to 
apply measures of energy efficiency associated to the rental market enlargement is suggest-
ed.   
The economy could maintain the pattern of increasing energy consumption at the same time 
that reduction of the CO2 emissions if energy generation comes from green sources. In 
Spain over the last 15 years a strong energy transformation in energy generation had hap-
pened: with around 17% of total primary energy now coming from wind and renewables 
sources. This has contributed to a falling profile of the CO2 emissions in Spain. The new 
government has announced a new energy policy stressing the introduction of solar energy 
capture systems and de-regulating the role of prosumers. The new policy potentially will al-
low most landlords to implement solar systems to capture energy during the next years. This 
could strengthen the role of green energy in Spain. 
However, the hypothesis is that if the market-green premium is correctly perceived by land-
lords and tenants, then both groups could start a retrofitting process using different strate-
gies.  (1) No initiative for new houses (already isolated), (2) soft retrofitting (RentalCal defini-
tion) for those units with less than 15 years, (3) retrofitting/soft renovation for houses be-
tween 16-30 years old (depending on their registered state and quality), and (4) deep retrofit-
ting (RentalCal definition) for those dwelling with more than 40 years. Based on the hypothe-
sis that every year an average of a total of 5% of the stock is retrofitted (an average linear 
intervention on the stock is assumed but, as the experience says, the process will be pro-
cyclical, that is, increase the speed of renovation in the economic growth periods and reduce 
during crisis) it is expected that depending the age and quality, 5% of buildings in every cat-
egory may be retrofitted. With that retrofitting, the houses of category 1 would show a de-
crease of 20% of energy consumption, category 2 of 35% and for category 3 a reduction of 
45%.  
Evaluation of the Spanish energy conservation incentive system   
In the case of Spain, the grant incentives when applied in the past didn’t have a strong effect 
because there was small budget to cover the different retrofitting needs and possibilities. The 
energy efficiency incentive goals declared by the public institutions are not sufficiently clearly 
defined so it is difficult to obtain any incentive or grant to proceed with an energy efficiency 
retrofit. However, the perspective is positive due to the change on the Spanish policy per-
spectives for next years.  
From the technical view, the incentives are a bundle of rules compulsory for new construc-
tions or renovation works, so they are the only one effectively working. For renovation, some 
regions allow to deduct the total costs of energy retrofitting from the personal tax. It should 
be identified as interventions for energy consumption reduction.  
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It is expected that the government approves a set of new rules to implement these goals in 
2018, at least eliminating some barriers (like the ‘tax to the sun’) and allowing private initia-
tive to install green system of energy generation like the solar one. None of the plans are 
implemented so far. 
Suggestions for an improved incentive structure 
The following improvements are suggested: 
- Elimination of the fixed tariffs which reduce the savings for less energy consumption 
- Identify clearly the type of improvements to be granted  
- Increase the amount of grants to be sufficient to become an incentive. 
- Tax measures, like tax relief on real estate taxes 
- Co-finance at lower interest rates, especially in those cases with complete refurbish-
ment. 
- Administrative requirements simplification 
- Stress solar energy production systems. Implementation measures and network con-
tracts would be analyzed and addressed as the potential to obtain clean energy from 
the sun is large in Spain. 
- Subsidized credits with substantially reduced interest rates for private landlords as 
the current policy only is applied to large corporations or public institutions. 
- At the moment, the energy consultancy report is not required as compulsory in Spain 
(only the Energy certificates are compulsory), so the energy consultancy fee as com-
pulsary costs does not exists in our market. Saying that, as it is a cost for investment 
implementation, any deduction will include the energy consultancy report costs in 
those to be deducted.  
- Develop databases with energy information associated to market uses. Contracts, 
transactions and their economic and physical (housing and building) characteristics 
should be collected in order to facilitate the analysis of energy efficiency. 
 
Best case incentives/ideas 
- Based on a recovery in the economic situation, the best incentive should start from 
Government rules (actually, the Housing Policy Plan for 2018-2021 contains incentive 
for energy efficiency renovation in rental buildings but most applied in strong interven-
tions or new building for rent) but always when it dedicates resources enough to fulfil 
the goals. The collaboration with the private sector multiplies the effects of public in-
vestment. 
- Improve the legal complains’ system in cases of rent unpaid. Currently, it takes at 
least one year to launch the tenant affecting rental sector returns and expectations. It 
would be good to separate the social rent sector from the private rent sector (not 
clearly differenced in the Spanish market) and let the social services to take part in 
the former allowing the private investment to intervene in the latter. These could in-
crease transparency in the private rental market and make it become more attractive 
for investors. Legal differences and measures for both will add that transparency. 
- A finance pattern including reduced interest rates and long term maturity would be 
needed to stress the decision taken process to energy renovate rental housing build-
ings. 
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- A public plan for energy renovation of the public housing stock. The public housing 
stock of social housing is around 4% of the total stock of principal homes in Spain 
and those houses are in rent.  
 
United Kingdom 
UK energy conservation incentive system  
Heat Incentive (RHI): Payment is received for producing heat from a renewable and use it to 
warm your home. The homeowner is paid a tariff rate for each unit of energy generated. Do-
mestic payments are spread over seven years. Non-domestic payments are spread over 20 
years. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/consumers/household-gas-and-electricity-guide/extra-help-
energy-services/energy-saving-support-schemes-and-advice of the adjustments to the dwell-
ing with regards to the lease agreement needs to be agreed by both the landlord and the 
tenant – all decisions post energy improvement is subjected to the tenancy agreement in the 
UK.  
Evaluation of the UK energy conservation incentive system 
There is not enough incentive for energy conservation overall in the UK (for rental dwellings). 
The regulation discussed in question 1.1 only takes formal effect in April 2018 – a more clear 
answer to this question will present itself in the months after the regulation has taken effect. 
Currently, stepping up energy efficiency levels in the domestic sector is hindered by a num-
ber of uncertainties. For owners and investors, uncertainty persists over key parameters 
such as the payback period and market-supported rent increases. Technological progress 
and falling prices for the current range of energy efficient technologies and materials intro-
duce further uncertainty into the timing of the investment decision. For tenants, energy effi-
ciency ratings and even energy bills from previous tenants may only have limited predictive 
value for their own energy consumption.  
The existing incentive structures for rental dwellings in place in the UK are relatively thin 
compared to other countries. There is definitely scope for improvement in this area in the UK 
Suggestions for an improved incentive structure 
The UK requires a more formal financial incentive towards energy conservation in rental 
buildings, which people can trust. This is currently a difficult topic , given the failure of the 
Green Deal in the UK - again, the effect of the regulation to be imposed in April 2018 will also 
play an important role of what the next step in this regard will be. 
Best case incentives/ideas 
Low interest long term loans for energy efficiency investments combined with free energy 
consultancy in this regard will be a good start for the UK.  
For PRS properties, this is complicated by the split incentive problem, i.e. landlords do not 
benefit directly from the savings arising from these investments. Instead, the benefits are 
enjoyed by the tenants of these upgraded properties via lower energy bills and/or enhanced 
thermal comfort. Hence, the only way to recoup the investments is typically for landlords to 
obtain higher rents.  
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Denmark 
The Danish energy conservation incentive system 
There are rather strong building codes for new buildings and for renovation of old buildings. 
However the following can be observed: 
- A very weak subsidy linked to trading in energy conservation. This incentive equals 
around 2-4% of the capital investment in heat conservation. 
- A rather high fixed share in the tariffs in district heating systems. This means between 
30% and 60% of the heat bill for a 75 m2 flat with an annual heat consumption of 
10.000 kWh. 
- No policy to deal with the split incentive problem in rental buildings. 
- Relatively low heat prices in the cities, due to rather efficient district heating systems. 
- High heat prices outside district heating areas, due to high taxes on oil and gas for 
heating. 
- No specific incentive for generation of low temperature district heating systems. 
- High taxes on electricity for heat (for instance wind power), hampering the in a smart 
energy supply system needed integration of heat and electricity. 
- No incentive furthering the synchronization of investments in energy supply systems 
in heat conservation. 
- Zero tax on biomass for heat, furthering biomass based heating at the costs of more 
smart system relevant wind power/heat pump based low temperature heat in district 
heating systems.  
  
Evaluation of the Danish energy conservation incentive system  
- The building renovation code can be circumvented by calling house improvements for 
repair. In that way the building codes only seems to work efficiently in cases where it 
also pays to invest in energy efficient renovation. 
- Too high fixed tariff share in district heating systems hampers heat conservation im-
plementation.  
- Not sufficient possibilities for getting long term low interest loans, 
- Trading in energy conservation “certificates” is very inefficient and subdued to fraud 
and bureaucracy. 
- Incentives for an integration of investments in energy supply systems and energy 
conservation are not in place. High tax on electricity for heat hampers integration of 
heat and electricity. 
- Synchronization with heat conservation and the need for low temperature district 
heating system does not sufficiently function. 
 
In general the incentive system is not strong enough to ensure an energy conservation goal 
of 40% before 2050. 
 
Suggestions for an improved incentive structure 
 The benefits from heat conservation are not only within the heat sector. For instance reduc-
tion of kWh/m2 makes low temperature heat possible without extra investments in piping and 
house installations, which again increases the COP factor of heat pumps. This also increas-
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es the value of wind power for heat in the competition with fossil fuel and biomass resources, 
which again increases the value of wind power in general. In that way house insulation and 
low temperature district heating can be an important part of the integration of increased 
shares of wind power in a system of low temperature district heating, heat pumps and heat 
storage. Low temperature district heating also improves the economic efficiency of using in-
dustrial waste heat and geothermal heat, and reduces the heat loss in the district heating 
system. As a consequence it is a must, if heat and fluctuating inw power should be integrated 
to make this possible by: 
- Zero electricity tax on wind power for heat. Same tax as for biomass in combination. 
In order to support the integration of wind power and the heat market. 
- A tariff policy in district heating areas where it is recognized that the benefits from en-
ergy conservation comes from an energy system, and not only from the heat sec-
tor.   
- The first step in this tariff policy could be a change to a main principle of always 100% 
variable tariffs in district heating areas. 
- -Introduction of public guaranty for 30/40 years 2% fixed interest loans,   
- -50% subsidy to energy consultancy services. 
- 10% investment subsidy to heat conservation certified by an energy consultant. 
- 50% energy conservation subsidy to low income pensioners. 
 
Best case incentives/ideas  
- Good past experiences with a combination of energy consultancy and subsidies for 
energy conservation,  
- Good experiences with funds for energy renovation, specifically high subsidies (50%) 
for low income and old people, etc. 
- Good experiences with replacing heath consumption subsidies with “investment in 
heat conservation” subsidies. 
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The Netherlands  
The Dutch energy conservation incentive system 
In the Netherlands a wide range of rules and regulations have been put in place to stimulate 
energy efficiency within the housing market. Starting with the introduction of the energy effi-
ciency labels in January 2008, Dutch landlords and tenants have been made aware of the 
energy efficiency status and potential gains of their dwellings.  
Evaluation of the Dutch energy conservation incentive system  
Improving the energy efficiency of rental homes has been a function of the atypical supply 
side of the Dutch rental housing market. As almost 80% of all Dutch rental homes are owned 
by social housing associations, most of the government policy has been targeted at social 
housing. Through various set of incentives (Energiesprong, EPV) social housing companies 
have been stimulated to refurbish their housing portfolio and enhance the energy efficiency 
levels, especially of the oldest homes in their portfolio. Thus far, the vast majority of Dutch 
energetic retrofits has therefore been initiated and undertaken by social housing associa-
tions. For private landlords, the Dutch government has developed fewer schemes that have 
proven effective. Given that the Dutch market for rental homes has been tight (demand ex-
ceeded supply) private landlords have had little need to compete on energy standards.  
Today, the Netherlands faces a next challenge – the transition away from gas heating. In this 
challenge, also the energy efficiency levels of private rental homes are targeted. Various new 
incentives are currently being designed, ranging from green financing benefits to varying lo-
cal housing taxes that increase with the energy index (the invesre measure of energy effi-
ciency). 
Suggestions for an improved incentive structure 
Regarding the key parameters that are part of the RentalCal Tool, one should focus on fi-
nancing incentives (subsidized lending, green financing rates and conditions) and enhanced 
value capturing (rent increases, valuation bonuses for green dwellings). Today, in the Neth-
erland various pilots and plan are available to facilitate both. Rent increased (in the non-
regulated part of the market) are not capped, hence value capturing is sufficiently stimulated. 
By adding and varying local taxes, the difference between red- and green-labeled homes will 
be widened, and this will likely increase the valuation gap between both. Dutch real estate 
appraisers are including energy efficiency into their valuation frameworks and standards. 
This is further stimulated by the vocal request by Dutch banks that stress the importance of 
energy efficiency insights of the properties in their lending books, and therefore stress real 
estate appraisers to further develop these insights within their appraisal reports. Regarding 
the financing incentives, most banks but also (local) governments have financing instruments 
and benefits in place with which financing advantages are given to investment in energy effi-
ciency.  
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France  
French energy conservation incentive system 
The incentive system for energy modernization is defined by the French State. Following the 
EU directives, the individual metering of the tenants’ energy consumptions is now legally 
mandatory. Except the legal requirements which defined the energy efficiency standards for 
new developments, the energy retrofitting of the existing stock is based only on incentives 
despite the fact that the so-called law, „Plan de Rénovation Energétique de l’Habitat 
(PREH)“, voted in 2013 and completed on the 13teen  of August 2015 stipulates a total of 
500 000 housing units to be retrofitted annually (120.000 in the social housing stock, 380.000 
in the privatly owned stock) and an average energy performance of the existing housing 
stock to equate to 150 kwhep/m²/year in 2025 and  80 kwhep/m²/year in 2050. 
The historical analysis of the incentives devoted to energy efficiency shows the growing 
awareness of the French State about the multidimensional nature and the complexity of a 
policy targeting a better energy efficiency of the rental existing housing stock as it deals with 
social, technical, financial and fiscal dimensions. It reflects also its hesitations about the 
costs to the State budget. 
1. Social incentives / to overcome the tenant-landlord dilemma and the individual fragmented 
ownership of the private rented stock: 
a. The law voted on the 23rd of November 2009 (Decree n° 2009-1438), allows the landlord 
to charge the tenants with half of the energy savings for a max. period of 15 years (in fact 
from 0,40 to 0,60 €/m²/year representing a rent increase between 5% and 10%). A prelimi-
nary agreement between the parties being mandatory, it presupposes a social know-how and 
a common interest.   
b. Facing an old population of individual natural landlords, on the 17teen of August 2015, the 
French state has created a guarantee fund to allow this population to subscribe the 0% eco-
loan distributed by the banks. This guarantee fund is also available for low and middle in-
come households (owner-occupiers and natural landlords). 
2. Financing incentives / to provide a low cost financing resource.  
a. Since 2009, the 0% eco-loan is available for owner-occupiers and private landlords. Its 
amount and its maturity vary according to the type of works: 
- 1 set of measures, max amount 10.000 €, maturity up to 10 years. 
- 2  sets of  measures, max amount 20.000 €, maturity up to 10 years,  
- 3 sets of measures or a global performance (80kwh/m²/year), max amount 30.000 €, 
maturity up to15 years.  
The eco-loan is available only for natural persons (owner-occupiers and landlords). 
 
b. Starting in 2014, facing the difficulties to renovate large housing estates in co-owned lots, 
the possibility to subscribe collectively an 0% eco-loan is available for condominiums.  
 
3. Fiscal and tax incentives. 
a. A reduced V.A.T. rate of 5.5% for energy efficiency works 
b. A tax credit system available only for owner-occupiers.  
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Evaluation of the French energy conservation incentive system 
1. Social incentives / to overcome the tenant-landlord dilemma and the individual fragmented 
ownership of the private rented stock: 
a. As it presupposes a preliminary agreement between the parties, the system of sharing 
50/50 the energy savings does not work in the private rented housing sector. The main rea-
sons are the lack of private landlords’ social and technical know-how and the high tenants’ 
turnover rate (average = 5 years). On contrary, it works in the social rental housing sector, 
the average stay of an household being 12 years, closer from the maturity of the loan. 
b. The guarantee fund is rarely mobilized.  
2. Financing incentives / to provide a low cost financing resource.  
The conditions of the 0% interest eco loan are adapted to finance the average amount of 
energy efficiency works (20-25.000 € per housing unit). In 2016 and 2017, there were rough-
ly 100 000 subscriptions from which only 3% were taken out by private natural landlords, 
30% by private owner-occupiers and 66% by social public and private housing companies. 
The actual rate of E.E. modernization using the consumption of eco or similar subsidized 
loan may be measured: owner-occupiers = 0,27% /year, private landlords = 0,09% / year, 
social landlords = 1,00% / year.  
These rates may be doubled as other sources of financing are used by the different owners 
to get an estimation of the global rate of EE modernization: Owner-occupiers=0,57%/year, 
private landlords = 0,18% and social landlords = 2% / year.  
Nevertheless, there is a remaining qualitative problem. The option of a global performance 
(max 80kwh/m²/year) is rarely selected in the eco loan by the private landlords while, on con-
trary, it is one of the financing conditions in the social housing sector.   
3. Fiscal and tax incentives. 
a. The reduced V.A.T. rate (5.5%) is rather an efficient incentive as it allows to clear some 
practices of the building sector and it decreases the “black” economy. 
Suggestions for an improved incentive structures 
1. Equal tax treatment for the landlords and the owner-occupiers. To extend the existing tax 
credit system to private landlords (tax credit between 15% and 30% of the investment costs 
related to E.E with a max of 8.000 per person, 16.000 for a couple). 
2. The main problem in France is the lack of institutional actors (landlords) in the private 
rented housing sector. The success of the EE retrofitting in the social housing sector is due 
to the fact that they are institutional actors with the required know-how. The same sentence 
may be carried out regarding the profit municipal housing companies managing private rent-
ed housing stocks. So it is suggested, 
- To stop the existing tax credit system favouring the purchase of new dwellings by in-
dividual natural persons and to transfer the released State resources to implement 
the first suggestion (equal tax treatment for the different owners of the private housing 
stock).  
- To decrease the transaction costs and the level of property taxes on housing for 
companies. 
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3. To lead a “carrot and stick” tax policy 
- To modulate gradually the level of the property taxes according to the E.P.D. classifi-
cation of the concerned estates. 
- When the EPD of a large multi-family estate is classified in E, F, G to make mandato-
ry the presentation of the E.E. project in the assembly of the co-owners  
- To increase the mandatory legal reserve for extraordinary maintenance in the con-
dominiums up to 1% (per year) of the replacement value of the estate. 
- As it’s already the case in the social housing sector, to forbid the selling of the dwell-
ings classified in F and G.  
4. To propose a strong operational support to private natural landlords 
- To reinforce the role of the public platforms which integrate the financing, the negotia-
tion of collective eco-loan for the condominiums and the follow-up of the building 
works. 
- In order to ensure the quality of the building works to strictly preselect the project de-
signers and the building companies which will be powered by the public platforms, to 
be more stringent when accrediting the compliance of the building companies with the 
present label R.G.E.  
Best case incentives/ideas 
Among others the following elements to complete the “incentive structure” are discussed 
in France: 
- The modulation of property tax according to EPD 
- A simplification of the 0% eco-loan to favor its subscription. 
- The extension of the competences of the local public platform supporting private 
owners to facilitate their acting out. 
- To standardize and expend massively « simple » energy efficiency works (roof in-
sulation, change of the heating equipment...) to lower the investment costs 
through significant economies of scale.  
- To renew the E.P.D. calculation method  by the end of 2018 to make it more relia-
ble for natural persons.  
- To improve the so-called label R.G.E. („Reconnu Garant de l’Environnement“), a 
building companies and designers accreditation, criticized by the consumer asso-
ciations.  
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Summary  
Table 3 both summarizes some important incentive structures and evaluates their effects 
upon energy conservation incentives.  
A general conclusion is that within all participating countries there are clear shortcomings of 
incentives for energy conservation that comply with the energy conservation goals of the 
countries dealt with in the RentalCal project. 
Table 3:  Energy conservation incentive structures  
Country Present incentives  structures               Evaluation 
Germany 1. Modernization cost recovery: The landlord 
can charge up to 11% of energy moderniza-
tion costs per year on top of the rent for an 
unlimited period 
2.Rent increase: The landlord can increase 
rent up to a “reasonable” market price 
benchmark” 
3.Rental table bonus for low heat consump-
tion  
4. KfW loans for EE modernization and new 
construction  
5.EE- programs of the federal states for spe-
cific issues ( e.g. PV installation) 
6.Bonus for PV produced electricity offered to 
tenants   
Modernization rate is 1%/a (IWU 
2018) and much behind what is 
necessary to achieve the climate 
protection goals of energy concept 
2020 and 2050. The existing finan-
cial incentive instruments (e.g. sub-
sidies) are not sufficient for reach-
ing the envisaged modernization 
target rate of 2%/a neither for the 
total building stock nor for the 
rental building stock. 
In competitive markets the land-
lords cannot raise the rent up to the 
11% limit.  
Besides aspects of profitability oth-
er obstacles prevent the success: 
lack of knowledge and interest in EE 
or other investment priorities. 
Poland Building codes for new buildings are strong. 
For renovation of old buildings:16% subsidy 
to the loan conditionally that energy con-
sumption is reduced by 25%; 15% subsidy to 
the loan for buildings constructed before 
1961 improving energy efficiency by more 
than 10%. Energy Performance Certificate 
scheme or Green Premium don`t play nay 
role. Landlord can increase the rent by 10% of 
energy conservation investment costs. 
In the cities a typical rental building 
is in historical preservation areas, 
where it is difficult to reach the 25% 
energy efficiency improvement, 
that triggers the 16% subsidy. There 
is no special incentive for owners of 
rented apartments. 
 
 
 
 
Czech Re-
public 
New green energy scheme - direct subsidy 
max. 50 % for family houses and 25% -30% 
for multifamily houses and apartment blocks 
in Prague. Panel 2013+/ - long term low in-
terest loans for multifamily houses. Up to 90 
% of eligible costs in case of de minimis re-
gime otherwise up to 75 %.  Interest rate: 
1,12 %  for 10 years loan, 2,12 % for 20 years 
loan and 3,12 % for 30 years loan (Source 
SFRB  June 2018) 
Specific energy requirements linked to releas-
The incentives are sufficient to ex-
ploit a big part of the cost-effective 
energy saving potential. However 
despite this, large cost-efficient 
energy saving potential still remains 
unexploited. 
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ing subsidies. 
IROP funding scheme for multifamily build-
ings outside Prague. 
 
 
 
 
Spain Building codes with minimum requirements 
to technical efficiency of energy conservation. 
Can subtract 10% of energy conservation 
investment from income? Coming reform?, 
where energy efficient houses  will get a re-
duction in property tax. 
There is a lack of incentive struc-
tures in the energy conservation 
policy in Spain. 
 
 
 
 
UK Incentive for using renewable energy for 
heat.  
No efficient heat conservation in-
centive structures in the UK 
 
Denmark Rather strong building code requirements. 
But in connection to renovation it is possible 
to repair instead of renovate, and in that way 
“escape” living up to the renovation building 
code. A system with a 2-4% investment sub-
sidy for heat conservation purposes. This 
subsidy is being removed in the last energy 
agreement in the parliament. Heat conserva-
tion incentives are in this agreement almost 
not existing, and policies are being discussed 
in the public. 
No efficient heat conservation in-
centive structures, especially in the 
district heating areas, due to high 
fixed tariffs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
Since May 2016 Dutch landlords can apply for 
the so called ‘Energie Prestatie Vergoeding 
(EPV)’ (energy performance allowance), 
which is a subsidy that is granted if rental 
home are retrofitted to passive homes (zero 
net energy use). This subsidy helps them to 
recover some of their retrofit investment. 
After retrofits, rents can be adjusted to new 
market levels. As long as rents are over 710 
euros a month, no rent caps apply. Below 710 
euros a month, housing rents are regulated 
by a point system. Energy efficiency im-
provement increase the point score, and 
thereby the rent level. 
The scope and impact of the EPV is 
rather limited, as passive home 
refurbishments are a small minority 
within the Dutch housing market. 
Due to the upcoming transition of 
gas heating, the Government is 
currently designing new incentives 
schemes that will trigger retrofits 
on a larger scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France Building envelope components of new resi-
dential buildings must comply with minimum 
standards (component specific U-values or 
maximum energy demand for the whole 
building) defined in the so-called “Réglemen-
tation Thermique (RT2012) (max. 
50kwh/m²/year) 
In case of modernization of a whole housing 
building, the new components of the existing 
building must comply with the maximum 
 
 
The capacity to get an agreement 
depends, among others, on the 
social know-how of the landlord to 
negotiate. The more institutional, 
the better. The less professional, 
the worst. (95% of the private rent-
ed stock is owned by natural per-
sons owning few dwellings). 
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energy demand for the whole building pre-
scribed in the “Loi de transition énergétique” 
(max. 80kwh/m²/year) to get the correspond-
ing eco-loan ( 0% interest rate) or special 
financing (P.A.M.) 
There is no mandatory legal technical re-
quirement for retrofitting. 
 
After a premilinary agreement with its ten-
ants, a landlord can charge 50% of the energy 
savings for a max period of 15 years ( in fact a 
rent increase between 0,30-0,50 € 
/m²/month) 
 
The eco-loan with 0 interest rate is available 
for owner-occupiers and landlords. Its 
amount and its term vary according to the 
type of works: 
- 1 set of measures, max amount 
10.000 €, 10 years. 
- 2  sets of  measures, max amount 
20.000 €, 10 years,  
- 3 sets of measures or a global per-
formance (80kwh/m²/year), 15 years.  
 
Since 2014 a tax credit system exists, availa-
ble for owner-occupiers, tenants and free 
occupiers. Landlords are not eligible. Its 
amount varies from 15 to 30% of the invest-
ment costs according to the type of works up 
to an amount of 8.000 € per adult, 16.000 € 
for a couple.  
 
V.A.T. reduced rate ; 5,5% 
 
 
The rate of modernization using  
eco-loan or similar loan may be 
measured comparing with the total 
housing stocks of the different 
segments: 
-Owner-occupiers: 19.908.000 
units, 0.27% /year. 
Private landlords: 6.796.000 units, 
0.09% / year. 
Social landlords: 5.386.000 units, 
1.00% / year.  
Estimating the other existing 
sources of funding , the actual glob-
al rate of modernization may be 
doubled : 
Owner-occupiers:0,54% 
Private-landlords:0,18% 
Social landlords: 2% 
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Table 2:  Best case ideas and suggested future incentive structures 
Country  Best case/ ideas   Proposals for future incentive 
structures 
Germany 1.EE standards coupled with grants & low 
interest loans 
2.Tax deduction (10% of investment costs) 
3.Market premiums for EE investment  
1.High standards for new constructions 
(Nearly zero-energy buildings) 
2.Modernisation backed by increased 
subsidies and grants and  
3. Tax deduction for EE modernisation  
4. Green premium  in rental tables and  
5. Green financing beyond the KfW 
programmes for those financing 
schemes that don’t use KfW pro-
grammes 
Poland Energy audits linked to loan application and 
100% financing and 20 years loans. 
VAT tax deduction for investment in energy 
renovation of residential buildings. 
- Reform of the existing financing 
scheme in order to support energy 
efficiency improvements in flats inde-
pendent on location and in buildings 
located in historical preservation areas.  
Czech 
republic 
Energy consultancy program EFEKT. 
Education and training of professional and 
nonprofessional audience. 
Assist cities and regions in energy man-
agement. 
Projects for cities and villages and small 
business projects 
 
-Monitoring energy efficiency after 
energy efficiency measures is taken.  
-Focus on long term perspective 
-Remove barriers for decentralized 
energy production 
Spain Reduced interest rates for long term loans. 
Make it easier for the landlord to include 
energy conservation costs in the rent. 
Collaboration with private sector multiplies 
the effects of public investments. 
Elimination of fixed tariffs. Increase 
grants. Tax deduction measures. Sim-
plification of administration. Low in-
terest loans. Consultancy services 
should be deductible from tax. 
UK Low interest long term loans for energy 
efficiency investments plus free energy 
consultancy. 
Improve the energy conservation incentive 
of the Landlord. 
In general the UK needs formal incen-
tive structures for heat conservation. 
Increase the possibilities for landlords 
to raise the rent, when the energy effi-
ciency of an apartment is improved. 
Denmark - A combination of energy consultant certi-
fication + 30% public investment subsidy 
for average consumers. 
- 50% investment subsidy for pensioners 
with low income getting public heat cost 
payments. 
-Zero tax on wind power for heat. 
- Abolish fixed heat tariffs 
- Long term (30/40 years) low interest 
loans (2% fixed interest rate) for ener-
gy conservation measures certified by 
an energy consultant. Subsidy to cover 
a part (50%) of the energy consultancy 
costs. 
- Tariffs in district heating areas linked 
to the smart energy system value of 
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energy conservation. 
Nether-
lands 
In the Netherlands a broad coalition of 
various housing market stakeholders 
(banks, realtors, governments, construction 
firms) are currently developing a new in-
centives scheme to enhance the transition 
away from gas heating homes. This new 
plan will be implemented in 2019 and also 
involves green financing incentives that are 
linked to the home instead of the home-
owner. This will help to scale up energetic 
retrofits. 
Within the housing market, the social 
housing landlords have worked on 
‘energy plans’, which map their aspired 
progress regarding energy efficiency 
gains in the future.  
It is important that also private land-
lords are included in this debate. Thus 
far the national body of private hous-
ing landlords has been reluctant. But 
with the right mix of financing incen-
tives and government subsidies and 
penalties more momentum can also be 
generated in private rental homes. 
France The French incentive system is relatively 
complete except the aspects related to the 
tax credit. It’s rather more important to 
combine altogether the different incen-
tives. 
 
The main source of weakness being the 
prevalence of natural persons as landlords 
in the private rented housing sector, it’s 
important to promote the  
return of private institutional actors on the 
rented housing market. 
 
To extend and reinforce the role of the 
“Plateforme territorial de transition ener-
gétique” which may provide a global and 
integrated support to natural landlords 
 
To lead a carrot and stick policy. 
 
 
- Equal tax treatment for the land-
lords and the owner-occupiers. To 
extend the existing tax credit system 
to private landlords (tax credit be-
tween 15% and 30% of the invest-
ment costs related to E.E with a max 
of 8.000 per person, 16.000 for a 
couple). 
- To stop the existing tax credit sys-
tem favouring the purchase of new 
dwellings by individual natural per-
sons. 
- To decrease the transaction costs 
and the level of property taxes on 
housing 
- To provide a public guarantee on 
eco loans to ageing natural land-
lords owning rental dwellings in 
condominiums. 
- To reinforce the role of the platform 
including the financing, the negotia-
tion of collective eco-loan for the 
condominiums and the follow-up of 
the building work. 
- To modulate the level of the prop-
erty taxes according to the E.P.D. 
classification. 
- When the EPD of the estate is classi-
fied in E, F, G to make mandatory 
the presentation of the E.E. project 
in the assembly of the co-owners in 
large estates.  
- To increase the mandatory legal 
reserve for extraordinary mainte-
nance in the condominiums up to 
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1% per year of the replacement val-
ue of the estate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
